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ABSTRACT-This article considers whether state constitutionalism provides greater possibilities for workplace religious accommodation than is currently available to religious minorities within federal law under Title
VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964. We approach this question via a case study of the controversy over religious
accommodation for practicing Muslims employed by the JBS Swift and Company meatpacking plant in Grand
Island, N E. The case study consists of analyses of the requirements for religious accommodation under federal
law, examination ofthe reasons why religious accommodation under federal law was not achieved in the Grand
Island case, and analysis of Nebraska constitutional law on the subject of religious free exercise. We find that the
language in the Nebraska Constitution regarding protection of religious practice provides grounds for Muslims
and other religious minorities in Nebraska to seek religious accommodations in the workplace through state
government venues that they have been unable to achieve under federal law.
Key Words: accommodation, free exercise of religion, Muslims, Nebraska, state constitutionalism, Title VII,
workplace
INTRODUCTION

Third, we examine how religious accommodation for the
Muslim employees at the plant was framed by the news
media and public opinion. Fourth, we examine two competing constitutional frameworks for resolving tensions
between economic interests and fundamental rights.
Finally, we consider whether Nebraska's state constitution provides a suitable framework to secure religious
liberty.

This article considers whether state constitutionalism provides greater possibilities for workplace religious
accommodation than is currently available to religious
minorities within federal law under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. In matters pertaining to pluralism,
particularly religious pluralism, the dominant approach
is to examine federal law and the U.S. Constitution for
guidance. But while the parameters of our constitutional
rights are set by federal authorities, the states may provide
broader protections to these basic rights under their own
constitutions, provided that they do not offend against the
U.S. Constitution. For this reason, state law has a vital
role to play in resolving tensions between majoritarianism on the one hand, and the values of religious pluralism
and liberty on the other.
We approach this question via a case study of the
controversy over religious accommodation for practicing
Muslims employed by the JBS Swift and Company meatpacking plant in Grand Island, NE. First, we summarize
the facts of the Grand Island case. Second, we consider
the federal requirements for religious accommodation.

CASE BACKGROUND

Often short of laborers, packinghouses offer employment opportunities to a diverse array of new settlers, including practicing Muslims from Somalia. The JBS Swift
and Company meatpacking plant in Grand Island, NE,
became the locus for tensions between Muslim employees, predominantly Somali refugees, and other employees
over religious accommodations that the Muslim employees sought in September 2008 during their holy month of
Ramadan.
After hundreds of Muslim employees at the Grand
Island plant staged a walk-out in protest for break time in
which to pray, representatives of the Muslim employees
negotiated an agreement with the plant managers and the
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workers' union, United Food and Commercial Workers
Union Local 22, to move the dinner break for workers
on the evening B-shift 15 minutes earlier so the Muslim
employees could pray and break their daylong fast shortly
after sunset. The announced agreement provoked a much
larger counterprotest by other workers, including Caucasian, Latino, and Christian Sudanese employees. The
counterprotesters complained about favoritism toward
the Muslim workers. The walk-out by the counterprotesters led to a temporary plant shutdown. The agreement
with the Muslim employees was subsequently withdrawn,
leading some ofthe Muslim workers to again walk off the
job or quit in protest. According to the workers' union, 86
employees, mostly Muslim, were fired due to unauthorized absences from work during the controversy.
The need for workers seems to suggest that the meatpacking industry is willing to accommodate the religious
requirements of its employees. Meatpacking is physically
demanding and dangerous work (Nebraska Appleseed
Center 2009). The nature of the work shapes the boundaries of accommodation, because the workers on shift must
take their breaks all at the same time. The accommodation negotiated in the Grand Island case entailed a change
in the work schedule that affected all employees on the
shift, not just the Muslim employees. Although the management and the union were willing to make the change,
the other employees resented being forced to a change
they did not seek or desire. The other workers' refusal to
agree to the change made the accommodation impossible
and caused hardship to the plant in work stoppage, reductions in personnel, and verbal altercations between the
opposing groups that disrupted plant operations.
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION UNDER
FEDERAL LAW

Freedom of religion under federal law is protected by
the First Amendment. Its two clauses focus on complementary aspects of religious liberty, for the establishment
clause seeks to define the limits on government's activities pertaining to religion, while the free-exercise clause
seeks to define the extent of the individual's right to religious practice. The issue of workplace religious accommodation lies along the intersection ofthese two aspects
of religious liberty, raising such questions as these: How
far does the individual's right of religious free exercise
extend into the workplace? How far may the government
go in obliging private employers to accommodate the religious practices of their employees? In regulating religious
accommodation in the workplace, does the government
© 2011 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

entangle itself so extensively in the policing of religious
belief and practice that the result is an establishment of
religion? In order to understand the context for religious
accommodation under Title VII, we first must understand
the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretations of the establishment and free-exercise clauses. We turn now to a brief
consideration of the relevant First Amendment case law.
In defining the extent of the right to free exercise of
religion, the Court applied a compelling interest test in
Sherbert v. Verner (374 U.S. 398 [1963]). The petitioner
in the case, Ms. Adeil Sherbert, was denied unemployment compensation after being discharged from her job
for refusal to work on Saturday, the day of Sabbath in
the Seventh-Day Adventist Church of which she was a
member. The Court ruled that the state of South Carolina
imposed a burden on Ms. Sherbert's exercise of her faith
with its restrictive qualifications for unemployment benefits, and that such a burden could only be justified by a
compelling state interest achieved by narrowly tailored
means; the Court found that no compelling state interest
was present in Ms. Sherbert's case. The Sherbert rule was
used subsequently in several additional cases in which
state unemployment benefits were denied to employees
who were terminated over conflicts between their work
responsibilities and their religious beliefs (Thomas v. Review Board ofthe Indiana Employment Security Division,
450 U.S. 707 [1981]; Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Commission of Florida, 480 U.S. 136 [1987]; Frazee v.
Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S.
829 [1989]).

The Sherbert compelling-interest test was transformed
into a test for intentional discrimination in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith (494 U.S. 872 [1990]). In the Smith case, two Native
Americans were denied unemployment compensation
after being discharged from their jobs for use of peyote in
their church's religious rituals. The use of peyote was illegal under Oregon state law, even for religious purposes.
The Court found that a generally applicable law, such as
Oregon's drug law, was valid despite the burden that it
may place on an individual's religious practices, as long
as the law did not intentionally discriminate based on
religion. So whereas under Sherbert, incidental burdens
on religious free-exercise were deemed unconstitutional
unless the means were narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest, since Smith, incidental burdens
on religious free-exercise are permissible; only religious
bigotry made into law violates the U.S. Constitution.
As Duncan (2005:1185-86) has observed, the Smith
Court "transformed" rather than overturned the precedent
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in Sherbert. For example, if a state permits unemployment compensation based on an individualized evaluation of whether the applicant had "good cause" to refuse
work, to deny benefits to an applicant who refused work
for religious reasons is to demonstrate intolerance for religion. Thus the law defining eligibility for unemployment
benefits would be neither neutral nor generally applicable,
and so subject to strict scrutiny. Duncan believes that the
Smith ruling holds promise for religious-liberty petitions
against "public schools, state universities, governmental
employers, and state agencies. [Because w]herever there
are rules in government schools and bureaucracies, there
is almost always a process for seeking a discretionary
waiver of (or exemption from) those rules" (Duncan
2005:1187-88). When government agents are given discretion in the granting of exemptions, a paramount question will arise as to whether religious bases for seeking
exemptions are considered equally with secular bases.
The principle that the government is to maintain
neutrality regarding religion is central to jurisprudence
on the establishment clause. The controlling case for
establishment issues is Lemon v. Kurtzman (403 U.S.
602 [1971]). The Court's opinion in that case developed a
three-pronged test to determine religious establishment,
now called the "Lemon Test." To pass constitutional
muster, actions of government must (1) have a secular
purpose; (2) in their principal effect, neither advance nor
inhibit religion; and (3) not create "excessive entanglement" between government and religion. The challenge
for religious-accommodation statutes lies in the third
prong ofthe Lemon Test, since it is possible that scrutinizing the faith of those requesting accommodation in order
to determine whether the request is legitimate might cross
the line into "excessive" entanglement of the government
into religious matters. In the Lemon case itself, state laws
providing financial aid to church-affiliated schools to
support the instruction of secular subjects were deemed
unconstitutional, due in part to the excessive entanglement into the church's business that was expected from
the state's need to ensure that its money was spent as the
statute prescribed.
The requirement for employers to provide religious
accommodation to their employees derives from Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was clarified by the 1972 amendments to Title VII, particularly
Section 701U). Reasonable religious accommodation is
mandated, unless it would create "undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer's business" (42 U.S.C. 2000eU)
[1970 ed. Supp. V]). The exact parameters of the protection for religious belief, practice, or observance remain
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uncertain, because the legislature provided little guidance on what constituted "reasonable" accommodation
or what hardships should be regarded as "undue."
The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted undue hardship
expansively in TransWorld Airlines v. Hardison (432
U.S. 63 [1977]). In denying religious accommodation to
a TransWorld Airline (TWA) employee whose religious
beliefs forbade him to work on Saturday, his religion's
day of Sabbath, the Court found that it would constitute
an undue hardship for TWA to circumvent a seniority
system that was part of the collective bargaining agreement with the employees' union in order to assign another employee to work Mr. Hardison's Saturday shift.
The Court stated:
It was essential to TWA's business to require

Saturday and Sunday work from at least a few
employees even though most employees preferred those days off.... [T]o give Hardison
Saturdays off, TWA would have had to deprive
another employee of his shift preference at least
in part because he did not adhere to a religion
that observed the Saturday Sabbath. (80-81)
So in the Court's estimation, Hardison's religious requirement to keep the Sabbath carried no additional weight or
force than the nonreligious reasons that other employees
had for wishing to have Saturdays off.
Central to the Court's reasoning in TWA v. Hardison
was a concern about "unequal treatment of employees on
the basis of their religion" (84). As the quotation above
makes clear, the Court viewed it as unreasonable for
another employee to be required to work a Saturday shift
against his/her preferences in Hardison's place. To reinforce the point, Justice White ends the Court's opinion as
follows: "[W]e will not readily construe the [Title VII]
statute to require an employer to discriminate against
some employees in order to enable others to observe
their Sabbath" (85). Based on the reasoning the Court
employed in this case, it appears that any accommodation that affects another employee may be deemed unreasonable; an exception would be if the accommodation
involved finding another employee to volunteer to swap
shifts (81).
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in TWA v.
Hardison, finds the Court's lack of concern for religious
pluralism troubling. He challenges the Court's determination that it is impermissible for an employer to allocate privileges on the basis of an employee's religious
beliefs:
© 2011 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
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The accommodation issue by definition arises
only when a neutral rule of general applicability conflicts with the religious practices of
a particular employee. . . . [T]he question is
whether the employee is to be exempt from the
rule's demand. To do so will always result in
a privilege being "allocated according to religious beliefs," ante, at 85, unless the employer
gratuitously decides to repeal the rule in toto.
(87-88)
Implicit in Marshall's dissent is a complaint that the
Court interprets the requirements of accommodation too
narrowly. It follows that, if employers are not required to
exempt employees from generally applicable workplace
rules in order to accommodate religion, then employees
like Mr. Hardison are forced to choose between their jobs
and their faith.
Although the language of Title VII seemingly would
require employers to bear some hardships, just not "undue" ones, the Court's holding in TWA v. Hardison blurs
to the point of erasing this distinction. In its reversal of
the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court also refutes the appeals court's suggested means of providing
accommodation to Mr. Hardison, including permitting
him to work a four-day week or paying premium wages
to another employee to incentivize volunteers to work the
less-desirable Saturday shift. In rejecting these options
as unreasonable, the Court stated: "Both ofthese alternatives would involve costs to TWA, either in the form of
lost efficiency in other jobs or higher wages" (84). The
Court's reasoning suggests that any additional costs for
TWA constitute an undue hardship.
The Court's interpretation of the reasonableness and
undue hardship standards under Title VII is of course
reflected in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) compliance manual on religious
discrimination. The compliance manual instructs on the
undue hardship standard as follows: accommodation
creates an undue hardship "where the accommodation
diminishes efficiency in other jobs, infringes on other
employees' job rights or benefits, impairs workplace
safety, or causes co-workers to carry the accommodated
employee's share of potentially hazardous or burdensome
work" (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
2008). The EEOC explicates undue hardship in the context of scheduling changes and shift swapping as follows:
"it would pose an undue hardship to require employees
involuntarily to substitute for one another or swap shifts,
[however] the reasonable accommodation requirement
© 2011 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

can often be satisfied without undue hardship where
a volunteer with substantially similar qualifications is
available to cover" (Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission n.d., "Questions and Answers," emphasis in
original). Following the Court's direction, the EEOC has
defined any involuntary change in work scheduling in
order to accommodate the religious needs of an employee
to be an undue hardship on the employer.
A Freedom ofInformation Act request to the St. Louis
district office of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission produced the following information regarding Title VII complaints about religious discrimination
in the state of Nebraska. Between October 1, 2003,
and September 30, 2009, there were 358 allegations of
religious discrimination made to the Nebraska Equal
Opportunity Commission and 178 formal charges were
filed. Eighty-six of the charges are still open, and 92 have
been closed. Of the closed charges, 88 were closed by a
no-cause finding being issued, one was an administrative
closure, two were closed because the complaining party
withdrew or failed to cooperate, and one was closed by
issuance of a Notice of a Right to Sue, which indicates
that the complaining party was given permission to file a
lawsuit against their employer but that the EEOC found
an insufficient basis to pursue the claim. These statistics
demonstrate that complaints about religious discrimination against Nebraska employers nearly always resolve
in favor of the employer, in keeping with the expansive
interpretation of undue hardship that the Court and EEOC
employ. It is important to recognize that overall, few
Title VII charges are resolved in the complaining party's
favor. The EEOC's national statistics for fiscal year 2009
report that, of the 68,710 charges filed, less than one in
five (19.9%) were closed with a favorable outcome for the
complaining party (merit resolutions) (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission n.d., Title VII charges).
No doubt some of the other 80.1% of charges genuinely
were without merit, but the test used to weigh these charges also clearly favors the employer.
Prenkert and Magid (2006) develop what they term a
"Hobson's choice model" as a framework for determining how religion should be accommodated. Their model
prescribes a review to establish the sincerity of the employee's religious belief, practice, or observance. It also
prescribes that the employer produces concrete evidence
of undue hardship. Under their framework, a reasonable
accommodation would weigh the evidence of hardship
against the evidence of the significance of religion to the
employee. The difficulty with such a balancing test is that
hardship for the employer could be easily quantified in
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economic terms, while the religious sincerity of the employee or the consequences to the employee of violating
the tenets of his or her religion in order to meet obligations of employment would be difficult or impossible to
quantify. This disparity makes it unlikely that "weighing"
hardship against sincerity could produce predictable protections for workers seeking religious accommodation. In
addition, as previously mentioned, an attempt to evaluate
the employee's sincerity may run afoul of the third prong
of the Lemon Test, entangling government in religion to
the extent of violating the establishment clause.
More helpfully, Prenkert and Magid's model recommends disentangling charges of disparate treatment from
religious accommodation. They note that the "notion of
neutrality toward religion, which is the hallmark and
goal of disparate treatment, is present in situations calling for accommodation. As a result, it remains important
to keep the two claims distinct" (Prenkert and Magid
2006:5lO). In situations calling for accommodation, the
religion-neutral, generally applicable work rule or policy
conflicts with the employee's religious belief, practice,
or observance. Exempting the employee from the rule or
policy will not be religion-neutral, as Justice Marshall
also noted in his dissent to TWA v. Hardison. When disparate treatment is conflated with religious accommodation, the effect is to undermine the reasoning in support
of accommodation. The Supreme Court, in its 1990
Smith decision, ruled that the free-exercise clause does
not require the granting of religious exemptions from
generally applicable laws. This reasoning implies the
same principle for workplace accommodation: neither are
employers required to exempt employees from generally
applicable workplace rules or policies. However, there is
one area of discrimination law in which accommodation
is regarded as necessary to equality in the workplace
rather than being regarded as special or disparate treatment. In this regard, accommodation within the context
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides a
useful comparison.
Christine Jolls has argued that the disparate impact liability under Title VII overlaps with accommodation under ADA, because contrary to disparate treatment claims,
disparate impact "occurs when employers rely on facially
neutral practices that cause disproportionate harm to a
particular group of employees and are not justified by
job relatedness and business necessity" (Jolls 2001:647).
There is a clear similarity between the two types of claim
in that the policy at issue is neutral and claimants need not
demonstrate intent to discriminate. However, a crucial
difference remains:
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The standard judicial remedy in a Title VII
disparate impact case requires the employer to
change the policy or standard for everybody,
not just the protected group .... By contrast,
a successful ADA reasonable accommodation
case requires the employer to take special steps
to [benefit] a particular group, but not for everybody. (Schwab and Willborn 2003:1238)
The accommodation requirement in ADA places greater
burdens on employers than does the accommodation
requirement under Title VII. As Schwab and Willborn
(2003) observe:
Under Title VII's disparate impact doctrine,
the courts explicitly look for economic costs.
If found, the analysis ends and the employer
wins .... The ADA, at its core, requires employers to absorb these costs unless they are
unreasonable or create an undue hardship; Title
VII, at its core, avoids imposing these costs on
employers. (1246)
To achieve its goal of integrating persons with disabilities
as full participants in the workforce and the society, the
ADA acts as an affirmative action policy, requiring employers to treat qualified employees with disabilities more
favorably than others, even if they cost more to employ
or are less productive (Schwab and Willborn 2003:1204).
Title VII seeks to eliminate bias against individuals based
on characteristics such as race, sex, religion, national origin, or other characteristics that are deemed irrelevant to
employment, but not to function as affirmative action for
individuals from those groups.
Even though the ADA statute mimics the language
of Title VII regarding "reasonable accommodation" and
"undue hardship," the standards for accommodation of
disabled persons are quite different from the standards
for accommodation based on religion. As Schoenbaum
explains, both statutes prohibit employers from making
adverse decisions about employment based on a prospective employee's disabilities or protected traits. This prohibition is defensible as a means to prevent discrimination
in the hiring process, but it obstructs accommodation
once the person is employed:
The limitations on preemployment inquiries
construct who the applicant is to the employer,
determining which characteristics are relevant
to the employment relationship and which
© 2011 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
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are relegated to the realm of the personal.
Removing these facets of people's lives from
consideration creates a very particular vision
of the model employee-white, male, straight,
middle-class, not primary caregiver, not disabled, of an unobtrusive religious faith, speaking English as a primary language-because
these are the default traits that are assumed to
fit the structure of the overwhelming majority
of American workplaces today. (Schoenbaum
2007:120)
The prohibition on preemployment inquiries is supposed
to foster impartiality, but in practice it may "disguise
how the particularized views of dominant groups appear
universal" and make accommodation requests "appear
as particularized claims for special interests rather than
elements that have been ignored by the supposedly neutral standard" (Schoenbaum 2007:122). In this regard, an
advantage of the ADA standards for reasonable accommodation is that after the hiring decision, the ADA reaffirms the relevance of the person's trait-disability-to
the employment relationship "by requiring employers to
accommodate employees' traits that fall outside the stereotype of the model employee" (Schoenbaum 2007:141).
The ADA defines employment discrimination as, among
other things, a failure to make "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability" (quoted
in Emens 2008:877). Title VII, of course, also prohibits
discrimination based on religion, using botl1 a similar
structure and similar language to the ADA statute. But
because of the Court's expansive rendering of "undue
hardship" for employers under Title VII, in practice the
ADA accomplishes what Title VII does not-it makes
clear that accommodation is essential to achieving the
goal of equality within the workplace rather than construing accommodation as special treatment for a particular
group of employees.
As was discussed earlier in the case background
section, JBS Swift and Company was prepared to make
a reasonable accommodation to the plant's Muslim
employees, but the agreement was abandoned due to a
backlash from other plant employees who regarded the
accommodation as special treatment for the Muslim
employees. The consequences of the other employees'
opposition to the accommodation created hardship for
the plant; the accommodation itself did not. Thus it is
important to understand how the religious accommodation issue was perceived in the local community. The
© 2011 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

following section provides some empirical information
on these matters.
NEWS FRAMING AND PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION

Local News Coverage of the Controversy
Because the primary obstacle to religious accommodation for the Muslim workers at the Grand Island
plant was opposition to the accommodation from nonMuslims, it is important to understand how the controversy was covered in the local press. Perceptions about
issues are shaped by the manner in which information
about the issues is framed. Local news reporting gives us
a systematic means of examining how information about
the controversy was framed within the Grand Island community.
The data reported in this section consist of content
analyses of the news articles and editorials about the JBS
Swift and Company Grand Island plant controversy that
were published in the sole local newspaper, the Grand Island Independent. The articles were located on the Grand
Island Independent website, which contains a searchable
archive. A search was conducted using the terms "JBS
Swift Muslim," which returned 19 valid articles. (Duplicate articles from later editions, letters to the editor, and
articles in which the plant controversy was not the focus
were eliminated from analysis, though letters to the editor
were examined separately for insights into how the public
responded to this news coverage-see below.)
Each article was coded for the presence or absence
of particular content: (1) an explanation of the requirements for religious accommodation under Title VII; (2)
an explanation of the religious observances required of
practicing Muslims during Ramadan; (3) claims about
hardship to the plant from providing religious accommodation to Muslim workers; (4) characterization of
the accommodation agreement as inequitable to other
employees; (5) characterization of the controversy as an
interracial or interreligious conflict; and (6) connection of
the controversy to immigration raids on the meatpacking
industry.
Only one article (5%) provided an explanation of the
requirements for religious accommodation under Title
VII. The absence ofthis content from the immense majority of the articles suggests that religious accommodation
for the Muslim workers was not framed as a legal obligation for the plant. The community may have been more
supportive of religious accommodation for the Muslim
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workers if it had been better informed of the federal law
that prompted the request for accommodation from the
Muslim employees and the attempted agreement negotiated by the plant management and the workers' union.
Less than one-third (32%) of the articles provided an
explanation ofthe religious observances required ofpracticing Muslims during Ramadan. The community may
have been more supportive of religious accommodation
for the Muslim workers if they had been better informed
of the religious significance of Ramadan to Muslims and
of the reasons why the Muslims needed to pray and to
end their fasting at sunset, rather than later in the evening
at the time the dinner break was usually scheduled. By
contrast, nearly two-thirds (63%) of the articles included
claims about hardship to the plant from providing religious accommodation to Muslim workers. These results
demonstrate that the local news coverage of the controversy was not balanced; the coverage favored reasons to
oppose the accommodation over reasons to support it.
A majority (53%) of articles characterized the accommodation agreement as inequitable to other employees
at the plant. This framing reinforced the idea that the
religious accommodation amounted to favoritism of the
Muslim employees. The value of majoritarianism was
elevated over the value of religious pluralism.
Slightly less than a majority (47%) of articles framed
the controversy as an interracial or interreligious conflict. It was more common for articles to identify the
counterprotesters simply as "non-Muslims" rather than
to describe the counterprotesters as well as the workers
seeking religious accommodation in racial or religious
terms. While this characterization seems defensible for
the purpose of brevity, a simplifying descriptor of a group
that was both racially and religiously diverse, the effect
of this framing is also to elevate the value of majoritarianism. If both groups involved are described in religious
and/or racial terms, then the reader is primed to evaluate
the controversy in the context of pluralism. But when only
one group is described in religious or racial terms, the
reader is primed to evaluate the controversy in the context
of majoritarianism-it's "us" versus "them."
Only one article (5%) in the Grand Island Independent
connected the controversy at the plant to immigration
raids on the meatpacking industry. And in that article,
the only connection was through a claim from one of the
striking workers, who was quoted as saying that plant
management had used immigration status to try to silence
some of the Latino counterprotesters (Overstreet 2008).
In coverage that the Grand Island controversy received
from news outlets outside the local community, the im-
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migration frame was more common. An Omaha WorldHerald article included immigration in a list of the factors
complicating the controversy: "religion, culture clashes,
refugee resettlement, immigration, union contracts, and
factory demands in an increasingly diverse American
work force" (Burbach 2008). And aNew York Times story
also gave the immigration frame prominence in its coverage, starting with its headline ''A Somali Influx Unsettles
Latino Meatpackers." The article's central message is encapsulated in this quotation: "But the dispute peeled back
a layer of civility in this southern Nebraska city of 47,000,
revealing slow-burning racial and ethnic tensions that
have been an unexpected aftermath of the enforcement
raids at workplaces by federal immigration authorities"
(Semple 2008). Here we see that the nonlocal coverage
framed the controversy as an interracial conflict between
Somalis and Latinos and identified the immigration raids
aimed at Latino workers as a precipitating cause.
It is uncertain why the local paper's coverage eschewed the immigration frame. But opposition to illegal
immigration is prevalent in Republican-dominated areas
ofthe country such as Nebraska: A Pew Research Center
national survey from March 2006 showed that Republicans were substantially less likely than Democrats to say
that illegal immigrants should be allowed to stay in the
United States permanently (Pew Research Center 2006).
Considering this opposition, it is likely that the use of
an immigration frame would have made the public less
sympathetic toward the Latinos' side in the controversy
and thus possibly more sympathetic toward the Somalis'
side.
We wish to be clear that the preceding analysis makes
no claims about the reporters' or editors' intentions in
covering this controversy. We observe the patterns in the
coverage and find their messages to be skewed against
religious accommodation, but this bias is likely to be
unintentional. The conventions of news reporting may
lead to interpretations and constructions that appear so
natural that they are invisible to the reporters themselves
(Edelman 1988).
Public Opinion about Muslims and Religious
Accommodation

The Pew Research Center's annual Religion and Public Life Survey demonstrates that the non-Muslim public
tends to see Islam as different from their own beliefs (Pew
Research Center 2009). Sixty-five percent of the respondents not affiliated with Islam described Islam as very
or somewhat different from their own beliefs. And those
© 2011 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
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who regarded Islam as different from their own beliefs
were also more likely to say that they had an unfavorable
view of Muslims. Sixty-five percent of those who thought
Islam was similar to their own religion reported a favorable view of Muslims; among those who thought Islam
was different from their own religion, only 37% were
favorable toward Muslims.
Though the respondents were able to offer opinions
as to the similarity or difference of Islam to their own
religion, the public's level of knowledge about Islam is not
high. Only slight majorities of respondents (53% and 52%,
respectively) were able to answer correctly that Allah is
the name Muslims use for God or that the Koran is the
Islamic equivalent to the Bible, and less than a majority
(41%) answered both questions correctly (Pew Research
Center 2009). These data illustrate why it would have
been important for the local news coverage to provide
readers with information about Ramadan, its required
observances, and its significance to practicing Muslims.
It is clear that the mass public has a limited understanding
of Islam.
Letters to the editor published by the local newspaper
give us a systematic means of examining public perceptions of the controversy within the Grand Island community. The data reported in this section consist of content
analyses of letters to the editor that were published in
the Grand Island Independent. Three letters directly addressed the JBS Swift and Company controversy, and all
three took positions opposed to the religious accommodation for Muslim workers. One characterized the Muslim
workers as "trying to impose their religion" on others,
and while the letter writer praised the Muslim workers for
their strong beliefs, he also asserted that "Catholics, Jews,
Evangelicals, Seventh Day Adventists," and any other
religious groups' adherents do not expect to "just stop
[their work] at a specified time to pray" (Letter 2008b).
Another queried: "Didn't these people know the working
hours of Swift when they accepted employment?" (Letter 2007). And he wondered whether Swift allowed its
employees who are adherents of other religions "to take
time off to practice their various rituals and rites." These
letters reflect the framing of the Independent's news
coverage of the controversy, emphasizing hardship to the
plant and characterizing any religious accommodation
as favoritism for the Muslim workers and inequitable to
other workers. Another letter writer described herself as
"disgusted" with the actions of the Somali protesters at
JBS Swift, questioning their claims of requiring special
religious accommodation ("Muslims do not have a specific time to pray"), the sincerity of their religious faith, and
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their loyalty to the company (Letter 2008a). This writer
praised other Muslims at the plant ("both Arabic and
European") and described Islam as a "peaceful religion,"
but she strongly condemned the Somali workers and their
requests for religious accommodation.
Perhaps this controversy did not capture the attention
of the broader community enough to motivate extensive
letter-writing or other widespread demonstrations of
community opinion. But those few who were motivated
to write were all clearly opposed to JBS Swift providing
a religious accommodation to its Muslim employees. In
this regard, the community opinion is consistent with
the opposition expressed by the JBS Swift and Company
plant employees whose counterprotests forced management to rescind its offer of religious accommodation. It
is clear that they regarded religious accommodation as
special treatment or favoritism toward the Muslim employees rather than a means of achieving equality in the
workplace for employees who were particularly harmed
by the later timing of the B-shift's dinner break.
CONSTITUTIONALISM, EFFICIENCY, AND
VALUES

The tension apparent in religious accommodation
cases is between economic efficiency and the protection
of a fundamental right. In a simple and homogeneous
community, this tension may be easily resolved. In a
complicated and diverse community, matters are not so
easy. As Laurence Tribe has noted, the U.S. Supreme
Court has increasingly adopted a utilitarian approach
that tends to favor economic efficiency (Tribe 1985). The
Court's interpretations of the reasonableness and undue
hardship standards under Title VII reflect this approach.
But as Tribe argues, utilitarian jurisprudence effectively
undermines the purpose of judicial review, a written
constitution, and particularly an articulation of fundamental rights: "That purpose, of course, is to ensure that
certain principles will not be sacrificed to expediency"
(Tribe 1985:613). Even when a religious accommodation
results, the process of attempting to weigh on a common
metric the hardship on the employer in comparison to
the employee's sincerity of religious belief, practice, or
observance seems to slight the very idea of fundamental
rights. As Tribe explains:
Being "assigned" a right on efficiency grounds,
after an appraisal of the relevant cost curves,
hardly satisfies the particular human need that
can be met only by a shared social and legal
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understanding that the right belongs to the individual because the capacity and opportunity
it embodies are organically and historically a
part of the person that she is, and not for any
purely contingent and essentially managerial
reason. (Tribe 1985:596, emphasis in original)
In the JBS Swift case, the responses of the other employees at the plant as well as the community (as represented
by the news framing and letters to the editor) demonstrate the lack of a shared social understanding that a
right to free exercise of religion is essential, a problem
compounded by what Tribe terms "the inadequacy of
technocratic jurisprudence" (599).
Laurence Tribe's framework would require constitutional interpretation from judges cognizant of their
constitutive role: "[C]onstitutional choices affect, and
hence require consideration of, the way in which a polity
wishes to constitute itself. In making such choices, we reaffirm and create, select and shape, the values and truths
we hold sacred" (Tribe 1985:595, emphasis in original).
But this role for the courts is not embraced by all. As
any observer of judicial politics in the United States will
recognize, constitutional scholars and judges themselves
have varying perspectives on the proper approaches to
constitutional interpretation and on the proper responsibilities of the courts relative to other political actors. The
framework espoused by Tribe is challenged by others,
notably Frank Easterbrook.
In his reply to Tribe, Frank Easterbrook argues
that "we get nowhere by listing values unless we have
both a metric by which to assess the claims the parties
make and a legitimate rule of decision" (Easterbrook
1985:626). According to Easterbrook, the benefit of
economic analysis, even when it is incomplete, is that
it provides information about the likely effects of the
Court's decisions. In Easterbrook's framework, absent
clear social consensus and/or more specific directives
from the political branches, the judiciary lacks the authority to decide to prioritize religious pluralism over
economic efficiency. However, a utilitarian approach to
jurisprudence is itself a decision to prioritize economic
efficiency. Because the "costs" to employers of making
an accommodation can be readily quantified and the
"costs" to employees of violating their faith cannot, a
quest for efficiency rigs the outcome against religious
accommodation.
The debate about how to balance economic interests
with the protection of liberty and diversity, sketched
here in the exchange between Lawrence Tribe and Frank
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Easterbrook, echoes across a range of issues. These are
difficult questions, and citizens as well as lawmakers and
scholars are confounded by the challenge of how best to
reconcile competing goods. It is important to be cognizant of the trade-offs as the search for better public policy
continues.
STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: THE NEBRASKA EXPERIENCE

If constitutions serve as contracts for the polity to pursue its political, social, and economic rights and liberties,
then it is appropriate to compare constitutions in order to
determine which constitutional texts and practices may
provide the polity with the greatest possible freedom and
security. A.E. Dick Howard underscores the importance
of comparative constitutionalism, particularly in the area
of human rights:
It is hard to imagine drafters of a new con-

stitution going about their task unconcerned
about human rights standards .... And judges,
wherever they come down on the uses of comparative data, cannot escape thinking about
the question of whether they should look only
to domestic sources or also to those from other
countries or those based on international law.
(Howard 2009:18)
While much attention focuses on national constitutions, much can also be gained by examining state
constitutions. Indeed, elsewhere Howard emphasizes the
theoretical importance of a state constitution: ''A state
constitution is a fit place for the people of a state to record
their moral values, their definition of justice, and their
hopes for the common good. A state constitution defines
a way oflife" (Howard 1998:14). Thus Howard's description of a state constitution reflects Tribe's argument that
the constitutive function of constitutional interpretation
must not be neglected or forgotten. Of course, it is incumbent upon public officials to ensure that a social contract
so constituted includes all. One complexity of the social
contract at the state level concerns the incorporation
into the community of new members, particularly when
those members increase the diversity of the community.
As is evident in the Grand Island case, the incorporation
of refugees from Somalia into the central Nebraskan
community has strained tolerance for diversity. Does
Nebraska's constitution define the good life to include
full membership and justice for these newest members of
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its polity? We turn now to a consideration of Nebraska's
state constitution.
One of the earliest constitutional cases involving religion in the state of Nebraska was State ex rei. v. Scheve
(65 Neb. 853 [1903]). This case held that it was the duty of
the state to "protect every religious denomination in the
peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship"
(878), echoing the constitutional language on religious
freedom (Neb. Const. art. I, sec. 4 [1875]). This case underscores that the Nebraska Constitution does not allow
the state to discriminate among religions, and beyond a
mere requirement of neutrality, the state has a duty to
protect religious practices. Thus religious pluralism constituted a feature of Nebraskans' self-definition from its
founding, yet subsequent decisions were not so inclusive,
particularly when the religious practices of newer residents entailed worship in another language.
In the years that preceded World War J, citizens of the
United States were psychologically and politically prepared to respond to international events with nationalistic
enthusiasm. Many people feared that German Americans
suffered from divided loyalties (Gaffney 2001). Nebraska
was no exception, and the constitutional history of Nebraska's language law reveals an ongoing tension over the
treatment to be extended to new residents who persisted
with "foreign" ways.
In Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod
of Missouri v. McKelvie (104 Neb. 93 [1919]), the court
upheld Nebraska's foreign language law, which prohibited the teaching of any subject in a language other than
English and included private and parochial as well as
public schools in the restriction (Chapter 249, Laws 1919).
Foreign-language-speaking parents, certain church corporations, and private schools requested an injunction
to restrain enforcement of Chapter 249, Laws 1919. The
issues of the case included the rights of parents to direct
the religious and educational upbringing of their children.
In addressing the underlying purpose of the law, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated:
It is a matter of general public information,

of which the court is entitled to take judicial
knowledge, that it was disclosed that thousands
of men born in this country of foreign language
speaking parents and educated in schools
taught in a foreign language were unable to
read, write or speak the language of their
country, or understand words of command
given in English. It was also demonstrated that
there was a local foci of alien enemy sentiment,
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and that, where such instances occurred, the
education given by private or parochial schools
in that community was usually found to be
that which had been given mainly in a foreign
language. (97)
Finding that the act was intended to address these concerns, the court interpreted the language law in conjunction with the compulsory education act, Chapter 155,
Laws 1919. That statute contained a specific provision
stating that the act should not be construed so as to interfere with religious instruction in private or parochial
schools. As a result, the court held that the purpose of
the language law was to abolish instruction in foreign
language in elementary schools in subjects that were required to be taught under the law. The court determined
that nothing in the law prohibited religious instruction
in a foreign language, provided that such instruction did
not interfere with the teaching of those subjects legally
required to be taught to children.
In narrowing the scope of the Nebraska language
law, the court balanced the liberty interest of parents in
directing the religious and educational upbringing of their
children, while upholding the limitation on instruction in
a foreign language. In so doing, cultural pluralism was
preserved to a certain extent, while the passions of the
citizenry were tempered.
Meyer v. Nebraska (107 Neb. 657 [1922]) was a second
challenge to the constitutional legitimacy ofthe Nebraska
language law. In that case, Robert T. Meyer, a parochial
schoolteacher, provided instruction to a student in the
German language using a book of biblical stories. Meyer
asserted that German language instruction was necessary
for children to understand and practice the religion of
their parents. In finding Meyer guilty, the opinion of the
court provides a glimpse into the popular sentiment that
prevailed during the era:
The legislature had seen the baneful effects of
permitting foreigners, who had taken residence
in this country, to rear and educate their children
in the language of their native land. The result
of that condition was found to be inimical to our
own safety. To allow the children of foreigners,
who had emigrated here, to be taught from early
childhood the language of the country of their
parents was to rear them with that language as
their mother tongue. It was to educate them so
that ... [their] sentiments [are] foreign to the best
interests of this country. (661-62)
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Drawing a distinction between religiously motivated conduct and religious beliefs, the court determined that the
legislation was constitutional, finding that the burden on
religious conduct was outweighed by the governmental
purpose espoused by the statute.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court repudiated the
Nebraska legislation limiting instruction in a foreign
language (Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 [1923]). The
Court noted that parental rights and religious liberty were
included within the purview of the 14th Amendment. Liberty interests included within the 14th Amendment could
not be infringed by legislative action that was arbitrary
or without reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest. Recognizing the legislative purpose of the Nebraska
language law, the Court stated:
That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its
citizens . . . is clear; but the individual has
certain fundamental rights which must be
respected . . . . [A] desirable end cannot be
promoted by prohibited means .... The desire
of the legislature to foster a homogeneous
people with American ideals prepared readily
to understand current discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate. . . . But the means
adopted, we think, exceed the limitations upon
the power of the State and conflict with rights
assured to plaintiff in error. (401-2)
The state government's decisions regarding Nebraska's
language law serve as a reminder that state government
is not always the best venue for a jurisprudence accepting of diversity. Local passions were eventually tempered
by federal institutions, consistent with the constitutional
framework originally designed by the framers. Yet elements of Nebraska's constitutionalism do offer the promise of inclusivity with respect to religion.
Despite the restrictive applications of the Nebraska
language law, Nebraska's constitution is unusually expansive in its protection of religion. The Nebraska Constitution states an affirmative duty to protect religion: "It
shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass suitable laws
to protect every religious denomination in the peaceable
enjoyment of its own public worship and to encourage
schools and the means of instruction" (Neb. Const. art. I,
sec. 4 [1875]). This passage provides a normative dimension favorable to religious pluralism. As Calabresi and
Agudo (2008:40) noted, Nebraska's state constitution (as
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well as those of Texas and Ohio, which contain similar
provisions) is distinctive:
These clauses are noteworthy because they
provide for a positive duty on government
to foster religious free exercise, rather than
producing only a negative bar on government
interferences with religious free exercise.
These clauses also protect the freedom of worship, which may involve action, and not simply
freedom of conscience or belief.
Nebraska's current constitutional structure offers a
blueprint for securing religious pluralism and extending religious liberty protections even to those, such
as the Muslim employees of JBS Swift and Company,
whose requirements for worship do not mesh well with
the established practices and routines of the majority.
If public worship for Muslims during the month ofRamadan requires that worshippers daily break their fast
and pray at or near sunset, and if adjusting the timing of
dinner breaks to near sunset does not interfere with the
religious worship of other employees, protection for the
worship of Muslims may require that an accommodation be made. Since the Nebraska Constitution lays a
duty on the legislature to pass legislation that protects
the freedom of worship for all religions, the legislature
could mandate greater religious accommodation than
is available to employees under Title VII, provided that
it takes care not to offend against the Lemon Test for
establishment of religion. The Nebraska Constitution
provides a basis to promote religious accommodation
as essential to the achievement of equality within Nebraska's workplaces.
The language in article I, section 4, of Nebraska's
constitution, laying a duty on the legislature to "encourage schools and the means of instruction," was used in a
recent case to argue that the state constitution provides
for a right to adequate education-the religious aspect
of the section was not raised. In Nebraska Coalition for
Education Equity and Adequacy v. Heineman (273 Neb.
531 [2007]), the court concluded that the question was not
justiciable, because there was no clear standard for determining what an adequate education is (Miewald et al.
2009:56). Should a case be brought to argue the religious
aspects ofthe section, the court could do likewise and find
the question to be nonjusticiable as a political question, or
perhaps the court would order the legislature to fulfill its
constitutionalIy prescribed duty to protect religion.
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FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

As the matter stands, the Muslim employees of JBS
Swift and Company in Grand Island, NE, have not been
able to secure accommodation for their religious requirement to pray and break their fast at sunset during their
holy month of Ramadan. The plant management and the
workers' union was willing to make the accommodation, whether motivated by a commitment to the value
of religious pluralism or, more likely, a desire to retain
workers in a competitive industry that suffers from labor
shortages. The religious accommodation was derailed by
opposition from other plant workers and by federal policies that prioritize economic efficiency and majoritarian
interests.
Individual and societal acceptance of diversity is often
difficult to secure, as was witnessed in this case through
local news coverage that framed the issue in terms of
hardship to the plant and inequitable treatment of other
workers, giving its readers reasons to oppose religious
accommodation, a perspective echoed in the letters to
the editor on the controversy. And while local passions
ought to be tempered by federal institutions, consistent
with the constitutional framework originally designed
by the framers, the U.S. Supreme Court's inclination
toward a utilitarian approach and the absence of stronger
legislative direction on religious accommodations under
. Title VII make relief through appeals to federal authority
unlikely.
Federal institutions have often served to control potential shortcomings of state constitutionalism, as the
U.S. Supreme Court did in the Meyer case. However,
Nebraska's state constitution includes the legislative duty
to protect religion, a stronger potential means of securing
religious liberty than is provided by the federal constitution, subject of course to the legislature's fulfillment of
this duty. Thus Muslims in Nebraska might fare better
in seeking protections for their religious liberty in state
venues. Although a federal structure is not a cure-all for
tyranny of the majority, federalism is a structural means
to limit government power and protect individual rights.
At times, the protection is obtained by guaranteeing the
uniformity of laws across the states, removing issues
from the purview of state governments, when the states
would be inclined to discriminate. At other times, the protection is obtained by devolving authority to the states and
allowing the states to adopt more expansive protections
for rights than are provided by the national government.
Nebraska's affirmative duty to protect religion holds the
promise of religious liberty for recent immigrants from
© 2011 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Somalia. What remains is a reaffirmation of the community's commitment to religious pluralism as a feature of
the definition of Nebraska's good life. Other states could
benefit from a comparison to the constitutional workings
of Nebraska so as to ensure religious liberty protections
for the newest residents of the Great Plains and beyond.
ADDENDUM

As this article was going to press, there was a new
development in the Grand Island meatpacking plant
controversy that served as our case study. On August 31,
2010, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.) filed lawsuits in federal court against
JBS Swift & Company's Grand Island, Nebraska, meatpacking plant as well as the company's plant in Greeley,
Colorado. The suits allege that JBS Swift violated Title
VII and engaged in a pattern of discrimination against its
Somali Muslim employees based on their religion, race,
and national origin. The E.E.O.C.'s complaint asserts that
JBS Swift failed to reasonably accommodate the requests
of the Muslim employees to take breaks from work that
would permit them to pray according to the requirements
oftheir faith and that the company retaliated against some
Muslim employees by terminating their employment
when they protested the lack of religious accommodation. In a press release, the E.E.O.C. reported that it had
received 85 charges filed by employees of the Grand Island plant that claimed discrimination based on religion,
race, color, or national origin stemming from the 2008
controversy (retrieved from http://wwwl.eeoc.gov//eeoc/
newsroom/release/8-31-IO.cfm). The lawsuit filed against
JBS Swift was the result of investigations of these charges
conducted by the E.E.O.C. and the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission. The lawsuit now is pending in the
U.S. District Court in Omaha. How the court will rule in
the case is still uncertain. The case is EEOC v. JBS USA,
LLC d/b/a JBS Swift & Company (D. Neb.).
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